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Rather, we can use resemblance, for instance, to infer an analogous case from our past experiences of transferred momentum, deflection, and so forth. And we can charitably make such resemblances as broad as we want. Tell the kids that you can command a wand to do whatever you tell it to. Once the kids have the pattern down (usually in about 3 to 4 rounds), toss in a second, what is billiards different color ball. Kevin Carter shows that best-of-3 and best-of-5 matches have only a small effect on who wins a match over a single game. What is meant when some event is judged as cause and effect? If the definitions were meant to separately track the philosophical and natural relations, we might expect Hume to have explained that distinction in the Enquiry rather than dropping it while still maintaining two definitions. There are several interpretations that allow us to meaningfully maintain the distinction (and therefore the nonequivalence) between the two definitions unproblematically. In fact, later in the Treatise, Hume states that necessity is defined by both, either as the constant conjunction or as the mental inference, that they are two different senses of necessity, and Hume, at various points, identifies both as the essence of connection or power.

Thus, objections like: Under a Humean account, the toddler who burned his hand would not fear the flame after only one such occurrence because he has not experienced a constant conjunction, are unfair to Hume, as the toddler would have had thousands of experiences of the principle that like causes like, and could thus employ resemblance to reach the conclusion to fear the flame. For Hume, the necessary connection invoked by causation is nothing more than this certainty. This is because, as Hume maintains in Part VII of the Enquiry, a definiens is nothing but an enumeration of the constituent simple ideas in the definiendum. With intricate details that can turn the tide of a game at any moment, kubb is simple enough for children and layered enough to engage adults for hours at a time. A simple illustration of one of the issues. Instead, the impression of efficacy is one produced in the mind. An object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determined the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other. An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter.

Two objects can be constantly conjoined without our mind determining that one causes the other, and it seems possible that we can be determined that one object causes another without their being constantly conjoined. For instance, D1 can be seen as tracing the external impressions (that is, the constant conjunction) requisite for our idea of causation while D2 traces the internal impressions, both of which are important to Hume in providing a complete account. Whether the Problem of induction is in fact separable from Hume’s account of necessary connection, he himself connects the two by arguing that "…the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other." (EHU 4.6; SBN 27) Here, Hume invokes the account of causation explicated above to show that the necessity supporting (B) is grounded in our observation of constant conjunction. Hume’s account is then merely epistemic and not intended to have decisive ontological implications. Having approached Hume’s account of causality by this route, we are now in a position to see where Hume’s two definitions of causation given in the Treatise come from.

For these reasons, Hume’s discussion leading up to the two definitions should be taken as primary in his account of causation rather than the definitions themselves. Noonan gives an accessible introduction to Hume’s epistemology. As Hume says, the definitions are "presenting a different view of the same object." (T 1.3.14.31; SBN 170) Supporting this, Harold Noonan holds that D1 is "what is going on in the world" and that D2 is "what goes on in the mind of the observer" and therefore, "the problem of nonequivalent definitions poses no real problem for understanding Hume." (Noonan 1999: 150-151) Simon Blackburn provides a similar interpretation that the definitions are doing two different things, externally and internally. And here it is important to remember that, in addition to cause and effect, the mind naturally associates ideas via resemblance and contiguity. Some scholars have emphasized that, according to Hume’s claim in the Treatise, D1 is defining the philosophical relation of cause and effect while D2 defines the natural relation. Some scholars have argued for ways of squaring the two definitions (Don Garrett, for instance, argues that the two are equivalent if they are both read objectively or both read subjectively), while others have given reason to think that seeking to fit or eliminate definitions may be a misguided project.